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experiences. However, most experimental
studies of this phenomenon have induced
negative emotions in subjects after a
learning experience. Work presented at the
recent Annual Meeting of the Society for
Neuroscience suggests that moderate
positive experiences can also improve
memory. Nielson and Bryant presented
three groups of subjects with word lists to
learn. After testing their memory of the
words one group were simply thanked, one
group were praised and thanked and the
third group were given a dollar and
thanked. At an unexpected recall test a week
later the group who were paid performed
better than the other two groups. This
suggests that moderate unexpected
rewards strengthen memories and, as
Nielsen explains, that ‘financial reward
produces significantly better effects than
social reinforcement’.  HJB
Criminal past influences bird
behaviour
Certain cognitive abilities are often
considered to be uniquely human, or at
least, restricted to primate species. These
include ‘mental time travel’ (using past
experience to guide future behaviour) and
‘theory of mind’ (ascribing beliefs or
intentions to another individual). However,
new research suggests that hallmarks of
these traits are present in the behaviour of
the humble scrub jay [Emery and Clayton,
(2001) Nature 414, 443–446]. Jays bury
their own food for later retrieval and are
notorious for stealing each other’s food if
they see it being buried. Emery and
Clayton set out to test whether the birds
modify their behaviour to avoid their
buried food being stolen. They set up an
artificial environment in which jays hid
food either in private, or while being
watched by another bird. The birds’
subsequent behaviour did indeed depend
on whether it had been watched, and on
whether it had a personal history of
stealing. Birds who had stolen food in the
past, and who were watched hiding their
own food, returned later to hide it in a
different place. Birds who were not
watched, or who did not have a criminal
past, left their food in its original hiding
place. Emery reported that, ‘we’re not
saying that scrub jays have the same
cognitive abilities as humans, but what
they do seem to possess is a close
approximation… the projection of their
own experience (pilfering) to the intentions
of another bird demonstrates many of the
hallmarks of theory of mind’.  HJB
Broca goes ape
Broca’s area in human brains is known to
play a key role in speech production.
Brodmann’s area 44, which is part of Broca’s
area, is larger in the left than in the right
hemisphere and until now, this asymmetry
has been considered to be a uniquely human
trait. But Cantalupo and Hopkins [Nature
(2001) 414, 505] have now shown that a
similar asymmetry exists in mankind’s three
closest relatives. Studying the brains of
bonobos, chimpanzees, and gorillas using
MRI, these authors have concluded that all
three species have an asymmetry in the area
analogous to area 44. As they point out, this
might seem puzzling, given the very
primitive vocalizations in these apes.
However, their observations support a
recent theory that the origin of language is
not vocal but instead tied to a capacity to
imitate and interpret manual gestures. In
monkeys, it is precisely area 44 that contains
‘mirror neurons’, which are active when the
animal both performs particular movements,
and when it is observing them in others.  MW
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not made of straw
In the October issue of Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, Bolhuis and Macphail criticized
the functional/evolutionary approach to
the neural mechanisms of learning and
memory, and concluded that the approach
is ‘often misleading and might provide us
with the wrong answers’ [1]. Their critique
touches on a number of interesting issues,
and provides a useful prompt to examine
the role of an adaptationist approach to
the study of cognition. In their effort to
stimulate discussion, however, Bolhuis
and Macphail have overstated positions
they attribute to ‘neuroecologists’.
(1) Bolhuis and Macphail state that
‘evolutionary or functional considerations
cannot explain the neural mechanisms of
behaviour’ (pp. 426, 432). Various
interpretations of the word ‘explain’ can
cloud this issue. Sherry and Schacter
([2] cited on p. 426) proposed that
‘functional incompatibility’might predict
the occurrence of distinct memory systems.
Their argument is that when different
types of memory place distinct functional
requirements on biological storage
mechanisms, independent storage systems
are likely to evolve because no one system
can meet the disparate demands. The
contrast between the kind of memory that
supports the gradual acquisition of habits,
and that supporting memory for specific
episodes in an animal’s life, is offered as one
example where functional incompatibility
might arise. It is important to be clear that
the prediction of the evolution of multiple
memory systems is not a prediction about
the specific neurobiological mechanisms
that would instantiate these systems.
(2) Bolhuis and Macphail imply that
de novo creation of unique cognitive
mechanisms or modules is the only way that
adaptive specializations in cognition can
occur (p. 426). This is clearly incorrect. It
should not be controversial that brain and
cognition have evolved, and done so by
small steps. Small differences in traits are
the very grist of evolution [3]. Thus the
application of an adaptive framework will
encompass quantitative and qualitative
variation. Although most students of
cognition hypothesize distinct memory
systems, neuroecology does not depend on
the existence of entirely distinct memory
systems. The neuroecological approach
begins by hypothesizing that evolution has
shaped cognition, and then tests various
subordinate hypotheses about specific
instances in which this might have occurred
(as in food-storing birds). The success of
neuroecology does not rest on the success
of particular subordinate hypotheses.
(3) Bolhuis and Macphail ‘suppose that
memory is a central system that is not
domain specific’ (p. 427, Box 1). They
question the existence of multiple memory
systems generally and argue that only
perceptual systems, which provide input
to the central memory system, can adapt
to specific information processing needs.
In Brief articles written by 
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This is a difficult position to defend given
the many dissociations of memory systems
reported in the literature [4]. Additionally,
it should be again emphasized that
neuroecology is not tied to particular
hypotheses about the specific form of
adaptive specializations. However,
natural selection may have selectively
enhanced or diminished the function of
specific memory processes in ways that
cannot be accomplished using traditional
neurobehavioral approaches [5]. Whether
this has occurred, and how many distinct
memory systems or processes exist, is an
empirical question. It is too early to
provide a definitive answer.
(4) Neuroecology is subject to the
difficulties inherent to any scientific
endeavor. Bolhuis and Macphail seem to
regard the fact that specific neuroecological
hypotheses have been discarded or refined
as a weakness. The suggestion that
neuroecology is misguided for this reason
is akin to suggesting that physiological
analysis of memory is a forlorn effort
because of the difficulty in connecting long-
term potentiation (LTP) to memory [6]. For
example, based on the well-documented
finding that the hippocampus is relatively
large in food-storing birds, Hampton and
Shettleworth tested the simple working
hypothesis that food-storing birds would
perform better than other birds on
cognitive tasks that were impaired by
hippocampal damage [5]. They found that
sensitivity to hippocampal damage by itself
did not predict the direction of species
differences in each task, and advanced
some testable refined hypotheses. It seems
reasonable to suspect that the enlargement
of the hippocampus in food-storing birds
has some functional consequence [7].
What that functional consequence is can
be revealed only if we do not give up on the
effort prematurely because the problem is
not easy. The fact that the results of lesion
studies and comparative studies do not
easily map onto each other in all cases
suggests that the comparative approach
might indeed provide insights not readily
garnered with traditional approaches.
(5) By focusing solely on the
relationship between food storing and
hippocampal enlargement, Bolhuis and
Macphail provide an overly simplistic view
of the contribution of the comparative
approach to an understanding of brain–
behaviour relationships. Neuroecologists
are the first to admit that volumetric
changes are a crude measure of neural
function [5]. They are also well aware that
selection for a given neural property is not
uniformly the result of a single behavior.
For instance, enlargement of the
hippocampus has been associated not
only with food storing in several families
of birds [8,9], but also with migration in
garden warblers [10], homing in pigeons
[11], and with brood parasitism in
cowbirds [12]. There are thus multiple
instances of a coincidence between
hippocampal enlargement and an
increased demand for spatial information
processing. Neuroecologists, in the true
spirit of evolutionary biology, find such
coincidences worthy of investigation.
The criticisms of neuroecology offered
by Bolhuis and Macphail create an
opportunity to clarify areas in which there is
confusion and disagreement, such as in the
kinds of explanation that can be generated
by a given approach, and whether there are
distinct memory mechanisms susceptible
to species-specific selective pressures. It is
certain that neuroecologists will often be
misled, hypotheses will be discarded and
refined, but the science of neuroecology will
stagger forward. As Bolhuis and Macphail
suggest, filial imprinting and olfactory
learning are excellent systems in which to
study the neurobiology of learning and
memory. However, alone they are
insufficient for addressing questions
concerning the evolution of brain and
behavior. Neuroecologists believe that the
universe of phenomena worth explaining
is greater than the universe of immature
domestic fowl and inbred mice.
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Everything in
neuroecology makes
sense in the light of
evolution
Response from Bolhuis and Macphail
We are grateful to Hampton et al. [1] for
their thoughtful comments on our critique
[2]. It is gratifying to see that we seem to
have correctly identified a mode of research
that can be called ‘neuroecology’. We feel
that the authors’ comments do not detract
from the main thrust of our critique. We
will reply to their various points in order:
(1) Explanation
We use the word ‘explain’ in the same way
that Shettleworth did [3]. Sherry and
Schacter’s proposals [4] regarding the
evolution of multiple memory systems
might provide interesting clues, but by
themselves they can of course never give
us insight into the mechanisms of memory.
This is the essential message of our critique,
which Hampton et al. seem to have missed –
function cannot explain mechanism. That
is, functional (or evolutionary) speculation
